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CA PREFACE
Since the end of the 1939-1945 World War, Britain's presence on the
land area of the Middle East has been steadily reduced. By studying the
military techniques, the how of British presence in South Arabia, rather
than the political why of that presence, it is hoped that certain lessons
might be derived that will act as keys to any study of such security
operations in the area. An attempt has been made to limit the consi-
derations solely to the area of South Arabia.
However, descriptions of military actions which Involve the expendi-
ture of wealth and manpower, can never attain the dignity of history un-
less larger political and social factors are weighed in the balance as
well. Military operations do not exist in a vacuum. The effects of
outmoded military techniques and thinking are usually, though not always,
fatal. Such shortcomings are evident in the South Arabian operations
studied, though each campaign was properly considered successful. The
British position deteriorated becauae of Ideological and nationalistic
pressures, and not because of military impotence. The very successes
that failed to maintain an imperial power in South Arabia are worthy of
study if future events in the newly independent states are to be fully
Interpreted. It is hoped that this report will point up, not only areas
for further research, but some of the basic facts of the situation in
South Arabia.
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I. SOUTH ARABIA
The last five hundred years have Co a great extent been the story
of the spread of European imperialism to Asia, Africa and the Americas.
Only in the twentieth century has the tide begun to recede. Indeed it
has only been aince the close of the 1939-1945 World War that Independent
nations have started to replace the Empires of the Europeans. As a re-
sult, the problems that men face in this century are to a large part deter-
mined by the incomplete Europeanlzation of most of the globe in preceding
centuries.
Between Europe and Aaia a geographic link is formed by the Middle
East. In the great age of nineteenth century imperialism, Britain, the
world's most active imperial power, came to view the Middle East aa the
quickest route to her holdings in South Asia. Accordingly, Britain
readily replaced the Ottoman Turks as the greateat land power in the
Middle Eaat in order to protect the routes to India. The great oil
reaervea of the Middle Eaat, centered around the Persian Gulf, gave the
area a direct and enlarged importance In the strategic thinking of the
European powers. Britain was not slow In assuring herself the lion's
share of the oil that fed the industries and military machines of the
great powers. In the last twenty yeara the rising tide of Arab nationalism
has diminished the phyalcal presence of Britain in the area to the extent
that she must now depend on the good will and friendship of certain
Middle Eastern nations to make her influence felt. A direct British
presence is maintained only In the small states of South Arabia and
the Persian Gulf, where Brltiah armed forces and political advisors
fulfil her treaty obligations as a Protecting Power.
The era of the old-style imperialism is ending, and the localiza-
tion of the last vestiges of British power in these vital areas of the
Middle East has given them still more importance in the global strategy
of the West. The passages through Suez and the Red Sea and to the oil
of the Persian Gulf are still of great importance in the last half of
the twentieth century. Ho new western enclaves can be expected in the
area, so developments in the last few British holdings have taken on
added significance. Thus, while South Arabia is important as a base
on the road to Asia, the fact that it flanks both the oil regions of
the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal gives it a strategic rank nearly
as high as either.
Maps of South Arabia show that several small states are spread
around the wrinkled surface of the southern rim of the Arabian peninsula.
Inland, the northern and central parts of the peninsula are filled by
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The boundaries of the South Arabian states
with Saudi Arabia and with each other are shown on maps to be rather
Inexact, a fact which both mirrors the heritage of the area and expresses
the many contemporary political problems to be found there. It is
probably Yemen, on the Red Sea, that is the least changed of the states,
and the least influenced by the British. Next would come Muscat and
Oman, where the British and others have begun to make themselves felt
with twentieth-century oil rigs and a few political advisors. Northwest
of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman the proven oil country begins with
the British-protected sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast, which fronts on
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both Che Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf (which zealous nationalists
have now renamed the Arab Gulf). Here British power has been felt since
the mid-nineteenth century.
Earlier, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British had temporarily
established themselves at Aden, on the southern coast between Yemen and
Oman. After a post-war withdrawal, they returned in 1839. Soon the port
of Aden was a British Colony, the most important base between Suez and
India. To safeguard the landward approaches to the Colony the British
entered into agreements with the petty feudal lords of Southern Yemen and
the Hadramaut coastal chain. Trade had only slightly exposed the tribes
to the outside world; politics continued to follow the feudal pattern.
The old ways of life have been very slow to change under the impact of
the British and the modern world. Boundaries have tended to crystallize,
and with then the relations between the tiny familiar atatea and the rest
of their environment. By a process of pushing and shoving the buffer
areaa have largely disappeared and boundaries are fast becoming the
province of nations rather than local sheikhs. The development of
these states must now be looked at in turn.
1. Yemen
Yemen is properly a geographic term
—
al-Yemen—the Yemen, which
refers to both the Red Sea littoral south of the Hejaz and to the in-
terior mountain range running aouth to Aden. These mountains are pro-
vided with adequate rainfall for the most part, and have the most tem-
perate and pleasant climate in Arabia. The Tihama coastal zone is at
the other extreme.
British traders were present in the port of Mocha as early as 1609,
but it was to be the Ottoman Turks who played the role of imperialists
in Yemen from 1517 to 1918. The Turkish hold on the highlands was never
secure, and it was only in the last decades of their hegemony that they
effectively occupied the coaat. In 1911, a revolt caused the Turks to
give up attempts to administer the interior. Leader of this movement
was the Imam, a religious and secular leader of the Zeidia, a moderate
wing of the non-orthodox Shia Muslims. Traditionally, the Zeidis have
been the ruling minority in the highlands of the Yemen. The successful
rebel, the Imam Yahya, gained atrength after the Turka withdrew in 1918,
and ruled far thirty yeara. He beat back a rival, British-backed claimant
from the northern state of Asir, vigorously apposing the influence of the
Saudla in the North aa well as that of the Britlah from Aden in the aouth.
Ibn Saud lost patience and, in a show of power, conquered Yemen in 1934.
Quieting the Imam by graciously returning Yemen to hla hands, the Saudi
then withdrew to face other problems.
In the British-protected Amirates to the south of Yemen fighting was
sporadic, reaching its greatest extent in the years 1925-1928. British
forces finally succeeded in turning back the Imam's incursions. In 193A,
a peace treaty was signed in which the British recognized the independence
of the Kingdom of Yemen. Both sides promised to maintain the status quo .
In future years each party was to give their own interpretation to this
phraae and the conflict waa to begin anew.
The Imam Ahmad (1948-1962) relieved the Isolation of Yemen somewhat,
though he remained a tough, feudal ruler. His predecessor had courted
Italian influence as a counterweight to the British. Now Ahmad Joined
the Arab League, cautiously leading his state into union with more modern
Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic (UAR). Aid waa accepted from
both the United States and Communist countries. Having crushed the 1948
revolt that killed his father, Ahmad put down rebellions in 19SS and 1961.
Before the Turks and the British consolidated their presence, the Imams
had ruled, briefly, the whole of a1-Yemen , and the Imam Ahmad repeatedly
sought to dislodge the British from the Western Aden Protectorate. After
being wounded in the 1961 uprising, Ahmed's health declined. He died in
September of 1962.
His son, Mohammed al-Badr, was Imam for one week. Much Influenced
by the example of Egypt's President Nasser, Badr had travelled in search
of foreign eid to Eeatern Europe and the Soviet Union. He was thought to
be reform-minded. However, he wes to have little chance to prove him-
self, es he waa quickly deposed in an army coup led by one Colonel Sallal
and directly supported by the Egyptians. Badr managed an escape into
the mountains, where he rallied tribal support. The army rebels mean-
while set up a Republic, which was recognized by several nations-
including the Soviet Union end the United States—and which retained
Yemen's seat in the United Nations. The Imam's forces continued to
control much of the Interior. His government retained the recognition
of Britain and several other nations. Saudi Arabia gave direct support
to the Imam's cause and it is likely that some aid also came from the
British. The Republic, on the other hand, received considerable tech-
nical aid from Communist sources and was effectively occupied by
Egyptian advisors and the Egyptian army.
The Yemen is in a position to dominate the Red Sea. As the most
fertile area in Arabia, it contains almost half of the peninsula's
10,000,000 people. The modernizing influence of the UAR-inspired
Republic has not yet changed the basic pattern of life, a pattern com-
mon to all Arabia until very recently. The seemingly chaotic feudalism
of the Arabs is in fact extreme local democracy. Unification into some-
thing like a modern European nation-state has only come to the Yemen,
for example, in this century. Chaos has been the normal state of
si-Yemen 1 and of all South Arabia. The extreme individualism of the
Arabs produced hundreda of medieval, feudal entities. Still, the
Yemenis, who have traditionally emigrated from their populous valleys,
have maintained an identity, a kinship. Only In the last few decades
have attempts been made to express relationships in Arabia in the terms
of European nation-states. As with the ideal of Arab unity, the
development Is something less than complete.
2. Aden
The South Arabian Federation and the South Arabian Protectorate
evolved from the position gained by the British In the port of Aden.
In 1839, after a wrecked ship under the British flag had been plundered.
Harold Ingrams, The Yemen: Imams. Rulers, and Revolutions . New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 4.
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an Indian Navy detachment under British officers took Aden. After
Hucalla and Socotra had been investigated, Aden was made a primary
coaling station for the Royal Navy.
2
The Protectorate was formed between 1882 and 1914, when twenty-three
small arab emirates entered into protective treaties with Britain. The
Governor of Aden Colony became Governor of the Protectorate as well.
Until 1937, administration was handled by the Governor of India in Council;
then, by a Governor who also served as Commander-in-Chief, and who was
assisted by an Executive Council. Crown Colony status was granted in
1935. Twenty-four years later a Legislative Council of twenty-three
members (Including twelve who were elected) became a reality. 3
In the early 1950's, discussions were held to consider the federation
of protected states, and in 1959 six states—Audhali, Lower Yafa, Fadhll,
Dhala, Beihan, and Upper Aulaqi—signed a Federal Constitution and Treaty
of Friendship and Protection with Britain. This Federation of Amirates
was Joined by Lahej in October of 1959, and by Lower Aulaql, Aqrabi and
Dathina (February, 1960). The Wahldi states of Balhaf and Bir All,
both from the Eastern Protectorate, followed suit in 1962. One year
later, Haushabi, Shaib, and the important Aden Colony were accepted as
members. 4 The remaining states of the Eastern Protectorate—the Quaiti
2D. C. Watt, "The Arabian Peninsula in British Strategy," Military
Review . XLI:2 (February, 1961), p. 38; hereinafter cited as Watt.
^The Middle Eaat and Worth Africa. 1964-1965 . London: Europe
Publications, Ltd., 1964; hereinafter cited as ME.
^ME, p. 67.
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of Shihr and Hukalla, Che Mabra Sultanate of Qlahn and Socotra, and the
Sheikhdoms ef Irqa and Haura—are now part of the South Arabian Pro-
tectorate. The promoters of the Federation hope that they will soon
follow their neighbors, and make the federal creation complete.
Moving from a1-Yemen towards the Gulf of Oman, the country becomes
ouch leas fertile and prosperous. The Federation and Protectorate are
estimated to support between 300,000 and 400,000 farmers and nomads.
Fishing, and some trading are round along the narrow coastal strip.
The coaatal range of the Hadramaut and the great inland valley, the
Wadl Hadramaut, parallel the coast until they turn to meet the aea near
the eaatern border of the Protectorate. This eaatern part of the
Protectorate lacks only sufficient rainfall to be productive. Irriga-
tion by cisterns dates back many centuries in the Hadramaut, but regular
droughta prevent consistent cultivation of crops. As it is, the best
land and most plentiful rainfall is to be found in the valleys north
of Aden, especially around LaheJ, Blocked by the deserts and the Saudis
to the north, many Yemenis have come to live and work in this area. How-
ever, Aden town itself averages but 5 inches of rainfall annually, and
in the protected areas the land suited for agriculture totals less than
10 percent of the whole. 6
5
MK, p. 67.
^e, p. 65.
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3. Muicat and Oman
Oman, controlled by the Sultan of Muscat, occupies the southeastern
tip of the Arabian peninsula. The topography is similar to that of
Yemen, with a mountainous interior and a low- lying coastal belt; the
Omani climate is much less benign. Generally, it is an area both hot
and dry, producing only a few commodities, though showing some promise
for oil exploration. Slavery and piracy have yet to disappear, and the
present line of Sultans, dating back to 1743, has traditionally been tied
to East Africa. Portuguese occupation of the area was brief. The
British came into the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf is an attempt to
establish trade. They found that piracy had first to be suppressed.
The links between Britain and the Sultanate have been as exclusive as
they have been informal. Treaties of Friendship and Commerce were signed
in 1891, 1939, and 1951. 7
The Sultan of Muscat has traditionally controlled the sea approaches
to his part of the peninsula. The Omani interior has been at times under
the nominal rule of an Imam, who closely resembled his counterpart in
Yemen in that he combined religious and secular leadership in his person.
In 1793, a junior line of the Imamate split off to become the Sultans
of Muscat. The mysterious Treaty of Sib, signed by the Imam and Sultan
in 1920, is the only formal declaration made of their positions in respect
to each other. It is believed that the Sultan allowed the Imam, residing
at Niswa, in one of the few productive areas of Oman, to retain his
7MB, p. 439.
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position of power in the interior. 8 After many years of harmony between
the two office* , the Imam Ghalib (1954- ) attempted to gain foreign,
especially Saudi, support for the formation of a separate state. In
December of 1955 the Sultan sent his forces into the interior, causing
Ghalib to give up his plans and go into retirement. Ghalib's brother,
the ambitious Talib, escaped to gain Saudi and Egyptian support.
4. The Trucial Coast and Britain
North of Muscat and Oman lie the Trucial States, with a population
slightly in excess of 100,000. There are seven of these states: Sharjah,
Ras al Khaimah, Umm al Quwain, AJman, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Fujairah—tiny
entities that have evolved from the sheikdoms with which the British
signed a Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity in May, 1853, thus giving
the area its name. In 1892, Britain acted to forestall moves by the
other Great Powers in the area, signing an exclusive treaty that rein-
forced the 1853 protection. 9
Subsequent agreements gave Britain the power to fix boundaries and
to settle internal disputes. To police the states and fight the slave
trade the British in 1952 created the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) , an Arab
force led by British officers and NCO's. In the same year the Saudis
backed their claim to the oil-rich Buraimi Basin, in Abu Dhabi state, by
sending in an occupation force. Three years later, the British used the
^he Times (London), August 6, 1957, p. 4; also, The Times (London),
August 19, 1957, p. 8; this newspaper hereinafter cited as LT.
*«, p. 461.
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Scouts to retake Buraimi and secure the area. Following the Saudi pat-
tern, foreign probes into sketchily demarcated border areas have been a
persistent problem for British military planners. These attacks, or
threats of attack, have most often been made by Yemen against the
Protectorate. However, elsewhere in the world the British, in Kuwait
(1961) and Malaysia (1964), have countered similar situations.
Two further types of operations have been undertaken in South Arabia.
First, there have been those garrison actions against local malcontents
within the protected states, a seemingly endless task in a land peopled
by volatile and combative tribesmen, who can always find reason for
opposing the authorities. In recent years, this problem has been inten-
sified as anti-imperialist propaganda which has reached the tribes of
South Arabia.
In addition, a third problem has appeared alongside the first two:
the rebellion within protected areas in which weapons and even trained
leadership are provided by a foreign power. The clearest example of
this type of action came in the Saudi-inspired rebellion in Oman during
1957-1959. The British operations in the Radfan mountains north of Aden
in 1964 were against a problem of this class.
II. POLICING THE PROTECTORATE
1. The Royal Air Force
After the 1914-1918 World War the British began to look for the most
economical method with which to control and police their extensive holdings
16
In the Middle East at well aa the tribal frontiers of India. They
settled on a combination of local levy forces led by Britons and air-
craft of the Royal Air Force (RAF). When necessary these were supple-
mented with ground forces from the strategic reserve held in India. With
the loss of the subcontinent these reserves were moved to Suez and Africa,
then Cyprus and finally Britain Itself.
In South Arabia the tasks of policing and garrisoning the protected
areas continued under RAF command, even after substantial British ground
forces were added during the 1950's. Until that time the task of securing
law and order in the Protectorate rested solely with the RAF, 10 which
provided close air support, supplies, and officers for the Aden Protector-
ate Levies, a force dating from 1925. A policy of collective punishment
was more or less standard when dealing with renegades harbored by the
varioua hill tribes. Aircraft were used alone or with the Levies to
chastise tribal groups whenever they indulged in evasion of taxes,
sniping at Levies, or similar offenses. Targeta for air strikes were
few. Large concentrations of tribesmen were seldom caught in the open.
However, in South Arabia at least, punitive strikes, inevitably preceded
by warning leaflets, were often made on tribal huts and forts. These
structures were often sturdy, well-made affairs in which the tribesmen
took personal pride. But more important than any damage inflicted seems
to have been the psychological effect of selective, controlled air attack.
The leaflets and the aircraft, especially the spectacular, rocket-firing
10LT, July 2, 1955, p. 6.
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Jets of recent years, served to point up the power and resources of the
government, as well as Its determination to back them up with loyal
ground units if necessary. This symbolic threat to use modern Infantry
seems to have been important. Also, the display of modern aircraft,
while it committed few men to a troubled area, apparently served in many
cases to save face for those tribesmen who were tired of fighting and
willing to give themselves up. They could always plead that they were
obviously and hopelessly outclassed by the potent weapons of the govern-
ment.
A few examples will suffice to show the nature of peacekeeping
within the Protectorate. Even in "normal" times, when no foreign agi-
tation was prominent, it was a tough, exacting Job. Based in tiny
Beau Geste forts which dotted the tribal areas, the British-led Levies
carried most of the burden. Without the communications and supplies
provided by RAF pilots flying from small airstrips near the principle
forts, the work of the Levies would have been almost completely
nineteenth-century in character. Besides enforcing the law, the RAF
had its full share of humanitarian missions in these primitive areas.
In the Hadramaut, where the threat of famine was always at hand, the
airmen specialized in food drops. In 1949, an especially severe famine
was alleviated by quick RAF action. During the same time, pilots were
supporting the Levies against Yemini incursions, and within six years
were directing air attacks against the ttma Hadramaut tribes, who had
decided to resist the inroads of the modern world. This 19SS incident
grew out of efforts by the government to alleviate local food shortages
18
resulting from spotty droughts. Trucks were brought In to distribute
foodstuffs more efficiently than the prevailing camel system. When
times became more prosperous, government laws continued to support the
trucks and began to threaten the very livelihood ol the camelman.
Saeed Benahlm Adhrami, chief of the powerful Summaa tribe, began to
burn back trucks travelling through his territory. Finally, In the
last week of June, 19SS, the Issue came to a head when his men blocked
the main road with boulders and proceeded to surround a 90-man patrol
of Qualti State troops sent to investigate. The tribesmen kept the patrol
besieged for a full week before a British-led force from Mukalla linked
up on June 30. A fierce engagement ensued, with RAF fighters driving
the tribesmen from their barricades. The tribal leaders took the first
opportunity to beg forgiveness and hurried to renew their pledges of
loyalty to the Qualti sultan. 11
A year earlier the sharp increase in shooting incidents in the
Western Protectorate had started a trend that served to obscure some-
what the serious nature of the affair of the camelmen and the truckers
in the East. Though the pressure of Yemeni propaganda was partially
to blame for the Incidents, the spreading disturbances followed the
traditional pattern. After enduring two weeks of constant sniping,
the Desert Locust Control unit was forced to withdraw from the Dathina
area. Then, within thirty-five miles of Aden town, four shots were
11LT, June 22, 1955, p. 9; LT, June 30, 1955, p. 10; also, The New
York Times . June 22, 1955, p. 4; this newspaper hereinafter cited as
HTT.
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fired (without effect) at members of the Abyan Development Board, who
with their wives, were just sitting down to dinner.
The news coming from the northern states wss even more alarming.
The Levies, carrying out routine reaupply details, were taking casualties
as ambushes sprang up. The dreary job of taking provisions and replace-
ments from the airstrip at Fort Ataq to Robat and lesser posts suddenly
became a hazardous one. After one patrol lost three dead and a like num-
l
ber wounded, movements between Ataq and Robat were limited to days when
RAF Vampire jet fighter-bombers could provide air cover. Late in
December of 1954, it was reported that, for five months, almost daily
sorties over Upper Aulaql had been directed against wells, roads and
cultivated areas. These Jet strikes were designed to deny the enemy-
thought to be disaffected elements of two tribes—the use of 100 square
miles of territory. The goal of the RAF was to drive the dissidents
into areas where they could be more easily controlled. However, as in
other instances where the air arm alone was used against fairly serious
and widespread disturbances, evidence points to limited success at
best. 12 The problems of policing the Protectorate began to loom larger.
2. British Ground Troops
The summer of 1955 saw the Ataq area become even more of a trouble
spot. Ambushes continued, and combined with the Quaiti disturbance and
increased Yemeni pressure along the border to draw British ground forces
NYT, December 23, 1954, p. 3.
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to the Protectorate. The commanders Air and Lend Forces, Middle East,
visited early Aden early in the summer, and in July the infantry began
to arrive. Airlifted from the Suez Canal Zone, the force totalled 1,000
en of the Life Guards and 1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. Within
a week of their arrival, most of the men were in action. On the week
end of July 9-10 a composite force under Lt. Col. J. A. Robertson of
the Seaforths, preceded by RAF jets and 3 Lincoln bombers, relieved a
siege at Fort Khauri and opened the Mafidh road. Two days later, British
Jets, automatic weapons and mortars supported three squadrons of Levies
in an attack on the mountain stronghold of the Shamsi tribes near Robat.
Casualtiea were inflicted on the enemy, whose retreat was harried from
the air, and the operation was deemed a success. New Ferret scout cars
proved useful and before leaving Aden the Life Guards instructed the
RAF regiment in the operation of these highly-mobile machines.
British discipline and firepower made an impression on the tribes,
though on the government side some pointed to the fact that it had taken
a year and a half to chastise 200 dissident riflemen. 13 The worst inci-
dent of the year, an ambush of a Rohat convoy in which two RAF officers
and 8 of their Levies were killed, had occurred before British ground
forces arrived. Now, for some time, comparative peace was had, though
RAF and ground forces were kept busy parrying the border probes from
Yemen. Patrols and resupply columns still encountered sniper fire, and
occasionally lost men.
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Early In 1957, Venom jeta flew 8 aortlea to break up an ambuah on
Che main Aden Dhala road. Britlah Croopa were by thla tine carrying
their ahare of Internal aecurlty patrols, and dlaaident Azraqi tribes-
men accounted for the flrat Britlah fatality In over a year. On February
4, 1957, a 22-man patrol of the Cameron Highlanders left the remote poat
at Dijlbal for the short, rugged march to Dhala. Piped out of the post
to the strains of "Scotland the Brave" and "Cameron Men," the patrol had
just begun to aacend a 1,000-foot path over a ateep pass, when, at 2:00
p.m., a volley dropped the lead men. When the piper and major commanding
fell, prlvatea took over and returned the fire. One National Serviceman,
mortally wounded, fired several rounds before he died. The attackers
probably numbered no more than fifteen; the shooting lasted no more than
30 seconds. Total casualties were 2 dead, 2 seriously wounded and 4
slightly wounded. Since the mountainous terrain prevented the use of
the patrol's walkie-talkies, a lieutenant and one man slipped through
the 6 miles to Dhala. A relief column of Highlanders arrived at
4:45, having been held up for 10 minutes by rifle fire. They ware
followed by a force of Levies which were uaed to picket the road. The
wounded could not be carried to Dhala; instead, they were taken back one-
half mile to a mud houae; thla took two hours. The following morning
(February 5) a helicopter arrived and In three trips took the wounded and
dead to Dhala airfield. They were then taken by RAF Pembroke to Aden. 14
14
LT, February 6, 1957, p. 8; alao, NYT, February 6, 1957, p. 11.
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While this patrol action was more deadly than most, it was fairly
typical of innumerable ambushes. It is very clear that air action could
not replace patrols, and that it could not prevent ambushes and casual-
ties. Techniques of communications and casuslty evacuation have improved
steadily. However, they will always be difficult in country that has
been described as "a guerrilla fighters paradise."15
III. THE YEMENI BORDER
Throughout the rule of the Imam Ahmad of Yemen (1948-1962) there
were disputes and fighting along the border between Yemen and the Pro-
tectorate. It was clear that the Imam interpreted the status quo agree-
ments of the Treaty of Sanaa (1934) in a different manner than did the
British. Viewing the Protectorate as a temporary sphere ef influence
for the British, Ahmad felt that the treaty would restrain them from
further rearrangement of the various states. The British interpretation
was that a fairly effective border-line had been drawn. Only the final
demarcation of a f«w Areas was considered a point for discussion.
Continuous since 1949, Yemeni border actions moved out of the hit-
and-run class only after Britain's humiliation at Suez in 1956. Belhan
state in the Western Protectorate, forming a mild salient into Yemen,
was a traditional target. In July of 1949, the Sharif of Beihan aet
his men to building a customs house three miles within the accepted
border with Yemen. For two months, snipers harried construction parties
l5LT, January 21, 1957, p. 6.
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and finally the place was occupied by Yemeni riflemen. Using an old
strategem. Imam Ahmad built a fort one mile to the west, thus reinforcing
hla claim to the area. Beihan asked for British help, and, on September
2, RAT bombers destroyed the Imam's fort while an attack by Levies re-
claimed the customs house. Warning leaflets had preceded the bombs,
and only one Yemeni was wounded in the withdrawal. 1'6
The next incident of any consequence occurred in 1954, when the
Imam, to express his concern for the internal affairs of LaheJ state,
sent his forces across the border along the 10,000-foot Mukheiras plateau.
These riflemen, numbering over 400, quickly surrounded a 20-man govern-
ment guards post, that was, however, able to summon help by radio. The
RAF, already busy with the Upper Aulaqi revolt, managed to supply air
cover for a strong force of Levies that chased the Yemenis back across
the border in a running fight that lasted 8 hours. 17
1. After Sues
The Sues debacle in the sutumn of 19S6 caused British prestige to
plummet in the Middle East. British power appeared, to the Imam of
Yemen and to others, to be more vulnerable in South Arabia than it
actually was. At the very time that internal troubles brought in-
creasing commitment of British ground units to the Protectorate, the
Imam made his most sustained effort to force the border issue by arms.
16NYT, September 10, 1949, p. 29; NYT, September 11, 1949, p. 3;
NYT, September 13, 1949, p. 16.
17NYT, December 23, 1934, p. 3.
In December of 1956, he sent his regular* and irregulars into Che pro-
tected border states and the resulting clashes, though tiny, were large
by South Arabian frontier standards.
The Yemeni forces persisted in their attacks and the British soon
realised that the probes were more serious than tha usual hit-and-run.
The two main Yeueni drives—from Harib into Belhan state and from
Qataba into the Dhala area—were initially successful against the Aden
Protectorate Levies that served as border police. By January 14, 1957,
the Yemenis had occupied a salient in Beihan that was about 6 miles
deep and 10 miles wide. Some Belhani tribesmen, long the targets of
bribes from the Yemen, Joined the invaders. 18
As the attacks on the Levies and tribal guards became more wide-
spread, Air Vice Marshal G. L. Sinclair, commanding the British and
Protectorate forces in South Arabia, prepared for more of what he termed
"military tiddleywinks."19 Two platoons of the Durham Light Infantry
moved to aecure the Manawa road to the north. Firing around the Beihan
salient intensified but continued to be inaccurate. A reinforced company
of the Cameren Highlanders, numbering 200 men, joined two companies of
the Levies and about 250 tribal guards in containing the drive into Beihan.
Two machine gun sections were moved up and fire fights developed (January
12-14, 1957). The actions continued to follow a singularly Arabian pat-
tern, with great amounts of ammunition being expended with very little
18
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effect. Five armored car* did sustain hits, but only one Briton and
five of the Levies sustained wounds serious enough to report. The men
from the Yemen continued to hold on to the villages of Hadhiya and
Sawdaniya, though a company of Levies drove a force of 300 Yemenis
back across the border near Ghania. 20
The doughty Sharif Husein bin Ahmed Am Kuhsin of Reihan, who had
seen Yemeni Incursions under his father's rule, claimed that the Yemenis
were massing 4,000 men at Harib and that British support was insufficient.
The RAF jets were over the area but took no part in the early actions.
Said the Sharif: "They fly over once a day and then go back to Aden
and drink tea."21
Meanwhile, on January 26, the Imam of Yemen was opening his country
to a group of British, American, and Swiss newsmen so that they might
watch "British aggression and brutality" in action near the Qataba post.
The local Yemeni official, the Haib of Ibb, staged a battle by sending
his men to occupy some old British foxholes on a ridge that the British
recognised as the borderline. The Imam had never attempted to tax the
land south of the ridge but claimed that the British were forcibly
occupying the area. Later he would admonish the ten newsmen to tell
the truth; however, their reports did not provide much support for his
claims to the area. To the newsmen, the action of January 27, 1957,
seemed to be "more like a skeet match than an act of war."22 Yemeni
20KYT, January 24, 1957, p. 1.
21NYT, January 24, 1957, p. 1.
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tribesmen and regulars alike were armed with a motley array of rifles.
Bugles were used to communicate orders and a constant stream of men were
aeen moving to and from Qataba where the officials were handing out am-
munition. The British, for their part, marked their own field of fire
with smoke shells. Few of their mortar rounds fell on the Yemeni slda
of the border; most hit on the ridge Itself. Two Ferret scout cars
maneuvered on the British front. A pair of Venom jets made dummy passes
on the Yemeni positions and a four-engined Shackleton droned high over-
head. Finally, the British formed into a column and departed in a cloud
of dust, having made no attempt to storm the ridge and having inflicted
a few casualties on those Yemenis who refused to take cover. 23
Later, in Aden, five of the newsmen reported to the British commander,
Sinclair, that they had seen RAF planes fly over and behind Qataba. Sin-
clair stated that he had ordered a 600-yard cushion observed at the bor-
der, and that he would start a board of Inquiry. It was found that a small
part of the Yemeni charges were true. British aircraft had violated Yemeni
air space, but had not, as was claimed, terrorised the population. Neither
had British forces fired 200 mortar shells into a village in Yemen. Cer-
tain damaged houses shown reporters were, upon closer scrutiny, found to
be left over from RAF air action in 1925! The British had been most
careful to put a least on their firepower. As Sinclair was to state:
"It may have seemed like a funny battle. But we could have killed a
"HYT, January 29, 1957, p. 2.
lot of people end it would have been within the rules. "24
In the following month, February of 1957, British air action was
directed against the Beihan salient. Venoms flew 14 sorties in support
of ground operations on the first two days of the month. The villages
of Hadhiya and Sawdaniya were recaptured the next day. Meteor recon-
naissance aircraft flew 3 sorties, and four-engined Shackletons provided
a radio link between the ground and the Venoms. No fatalities were re-
25
corded on tne British side.
Soon modern military equipment began to arrive in Yemen from the
Communist countries, though very little of it appeared in the border
skirmishes with Protectorate forces during the next few years. After
a Republic was declared in Yemen, and civil war broke out, fights between
the two factions often took place near the border with the Protectorate,
though direct border violations decreased in number. The most serious
threats to the security of South Arabian states came to be internal re-
volts, outwardly traditional in form, but intensified by the addition
of modern weapons and trained leadership from the outside.
IV. MUSCAT AND OMAN
In the summer of 1957 attention was focused on Muscat and Oman,
where the former Imam of Oman and his brother were staging a revolt
against the Sultan of Muscat. A strong force of rebels had suddenly
appeared around the ancient Imamate capital of Niswa. Earlier, in
24NYT, February 5, 1957, p. 4.
25LT, February 4, 1957, p. 8.
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March, Che Sultan's beat fighting unit, the Oman Regiment, had been
called to the area to put down a short-lived local revolt. Now, the
Sultan's men, though led by retired Britons and seconded Pakistanis,
proved no match for rebels armed with automatic weapona and land mines.
The retreat of the Oman Regiment from the area quickly turned into a
debacle. On July 16, 1957, the Sultan appealed to the British for
help.
Britain aasured the Sultan that aid would be made available. Be was
a friendly ruler and Britain had a stake in the Persian Gulf area. The
campaign that followed was carefully planned and executed by professionals.
It met with less than complete success because the old, traditional tech-
niques were at first used. Along with some overly-cautious political
advisors, this allowed the Oaani revolt to continue to exist for several
months. Arab nationalists had plenty of time to exploit the Incident
for propaganda purpoaea, something the British hoped to avoid. The
political factors surrounding the campaign were admittedly complex,
but British planning and tactics seemed unnecessarily slow, exposing a
failure on their part to develop new approaches to the military problems
involved.
It waa not until July 24 that elements of the 1st Battalion,
Cameron Highlanders, were beginning to be airlifted from Gllgll, Kenya,
to Sharjah in the Trucial Statea. The RAF'a Beverly, a type of trans-
port plane in aervice since 19SS, waa used. Two of these aircraft were
at the disposal of Air Vice-Marshal Sinclair in South Arabia, and two
more were baaed in Kenya. These four Beverlys apparently made up the
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entire airlift strength In the area, each craft could move 100 equipped
Cameronians at a time, and thia was adequate. Meanwhile, four Venom jets
had been shifted from Aden to Sharjah. On July 24, they attacked the
fort at Izki—20 miles from Nlswa—in 12 aortiea. Warning leaflets had
been dropped 48 hours earlier. Leaflets were used extensively throughout
the campaign, and invariably preceded bombing and rocket attacks. Typical
leaflets were as follows:
Summary of First Leaflet: Tallb, Ghalib and Suleiman bin
Hamyar have stirred up trouble to serve their selfish ends.
Necessary steps will be taken against them until they obey
the Government's orders. As a demonstration aircraft will
fire on aelected targets after people have been warned to
get out. If this is not sufficient further steps will have
to be taken to punish the district harbouring the trouble-
makers. The remedy is in your hands: turn the traiters
out, send your leaders to us and fly our red flag.
Summary of Second Leaflet: Omanis, you have now aeen a
demonstration of the fire-power of our aircraft. Turn out
the traitors to avoid further destruction. Omanis, your
trade and prosperity are also in danger. During the last
two years I have built you a new road to bring your produce
to the sea, you have doctors living among you for the first
time, a travelling hospital and the advice of agricultural
experta. Above all, you had peace to enable you to go about
your lawful business. Now the traitors have come, the road
is blocked. Trade is Interrupted and every man goes in fear
ef his neighbor. Turn out the traitors and we will resume
together the march towards progress and prosperity in peace
and security.
Summary of Warning Leaflet: The Sultan of Muscat and Oman
issues a warning that your fortresses will be attacked by
aircraft the day after tomorrow. The object of the attack
Is not to deatroy but to demonstrate that we have effective
powerful weapons."
'Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debatea (Hansard),
574; 870-877.
To the north, the Trucial Oman Scouts, totalling about 1,000 men,
had a detachment at the Buralmi oaals near the rebel area. One company
of Camereniana had been at Sharjah for five months, and eventually four
other companies were flown Into Bahrein. On July 25, after 48 hours'
warning had been given, Venoms flew 12 sorties against the fart at
Nizwa Itself, expending 48 rackets and some 7,000 rounds from their
cannons. At Sharjah, the RAF had concentrated some transports,
12 Venoms, a Shackleton and a Canberra. As the air demonstrations
continued, some field officers grew restless. An officer of the
Trucial Oman Scouts declared that his men could be in Niswa in 24
hours "if the aocialists would let us."27
The torrid Oman! summer, traditionally a time when warfare waa
auspended, was at ita peak aa RAP transports distributed men and equip-
ment for the inevitable land expedition against the ex-Imam and hia
brother, who had enlisted the support of the self-styled "Lord of the
Green Mountains"—the noted Sheikh Suliman ben Hamyar of the Beni Ryan
tribe. Another potential ally had been eliminated in the March revolt.
Sheikh Ibrahim bin Issa al Hartha had found that 70 men were too few to
raiae revolt and had given himself up to the Sultan's forces. Forgetting
to secure safe conduct for hia peraon, he was immediately thrown in Muscat
jail. Later it was learned that Ibrahim's revolt had been timed to coin-
cide with that of the ex-Imam and his brother. Bad luck had ruled out a
27
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link-up at Che appointed time in the spring. 28
Now, on July 26, Sinclair and his staff flew over the rebel area in
a Shackleton. It was thought that the rebels held a 25 by 15 mile area
around Nizwa, but air reconnaissance had been unable to determine exact
rebel positions. The Highlanders, reinforced by machine-gun and mortar
sections, moved by truck (July 29-30) to Buraimi—150 miles from Niswa.
Venoms continued to attack forts in rebel territory, as well as vehicles.
This meant, for the most part, tearing up abandoned oil rigs of the Iraqi
Petroleum Company; or, at best, the American convertible in which the
"Lord of the Green Mountains" had emerged from his stronghold in 1955
to pay homage to the Sultan. 29
Newsmen grew annoyed at the seemingly deliberate misinformation they
were given by the British command. Preparations for a land expedition
were too obvious to be concealed, and the cause for the confusion probably
went deeper. When it became clear that air demonstrations alone would
not suffice to break the revolt, the British overcompensated by building
up a very large task force. As it turned out, a strong force was needed.
However, the Nizwa column, as constituted, was a strong composite force
that proved to be unsuited to the task of finishing the revolt. Several
British units were added for stiffening, but they were neither trained
28
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nor equipped to fight the three ringleaders in their home mountains.
Too many British troops were used for the job they vere allowed to do.
Always they had to play a supporting role to the Sultan's forces, for
political reasons.
Statements by British commanders seemed to have been merely descrip-
tive, and were to the effect that they were following a careful escala-
tion from (1) demonstrations, to (2) restrictions of rebel movements, to
(3) ground action. Unnecessary hesitation on the part of policy makers
explained to some extent the slow progress being made in combatting the
revolt. The problem of providing logistical aupport for a large force
of motorized European infantry added length to the campaign.
On August 4, the revolt was thought to be spreading to the populous
Sharqiya valley, 75 miles from Nizwa. A Shakleton was hit by two bullets,
and four more Venoms were brought into action. Ferret scout cars arrived
from Aden and the Trucial Oman Scouts occupied Ibri, Just 60 miles from
Nizwa. Air Vice-Marshall Sinclair stressed that speed was essential.
A veteran of composite forces in the Protectorate, Brigadier J. A.
Robertson, was named to command the land expedition, which was to be
accompanied by four newsmen. Lt. General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, C-in-C Land
Forces, Middle East, went to confer with the Imperial Staff. In the Gulf
of Oman, three Royal Navy frigates were stationed where two months before
a large arms smuggling ring had been broken. At the same time, elements
of the King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry were arriving to replace the
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Highlanders. The Nizwa expedition finally began to roll on Auguat 8. 30
1. The Nizwa Campaign
With much secrecy, a mixed force had been collected at Fahud, 80
ilea southwest of Nizwa, and the Sultan of Muscat was quick to laud
the RAP for its achievement in the field of logistics. Named for a
colonel of Scouts, "Carter Force" was spearheaded by one of the Sultan's
regiments which had been reconstituted to a strength of 200 men. On the
other side of the rebel zone, another of the Sultan's regiments slowly
made its way into the Wadi Semail, accompanied by 1,000 loyal camelmen,
in a move designed to blow; the rebel's routs through the Green Mountains
to the sea. As "Carter Force," combining Cameronians, 15th/ 19th Hussar
scout cars, Trucial Oman Scouts and Muscat! troopa, made its way from
Fahud to Izki, and thence from Firz to Nizwa, air cover was controlled
by an RAF man in "a little vehicle." Villages were told that the Sultan's
forces were approaching; the Britiah were carefully kept to the rear of
the column and out of the limelight. Hundreds of loyal tribesmen began
to come forward. The rebels had proven to be a nuisance, and the stoppage
of trade had caused the price of rice to treble.
A forward airstrip was eatabliahed between Izki and Firz, and it
was at the latter village that the only real fighting occurred for
"Carter Force." Two hundred hard-core rebels, dug in across the
approaches to Flrq, halted the advance of the column on Auguat 9. The
^LT, August 10, 1957, p. 6.
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rebels obviously were well-trained and were able to lay down very
accurate and well-directed fire, The three-part column—Muscatis,
Cameronians, and Scouts—withdrew six miles to the village of Kersh.
By this time, seven Britons were victims of heat exhaustion. The fort
at Flrq and caves in the surrounding hillsides provide'', targets for the
RAF. Venoms were called in and succeeded in knocking down one of the
towers of the fort.
During the night of August 10-11 the Cameronians moved off to climb
the valley walls on the right of the column. By morning they were in a
position to direct enfilading fire against the rebel positions in a date
grove. The Hussars drove out to cover the rolling country on the left.
Little resistance was encountered, probably due to the August 10 bombing
raid by a lone Sbackleton in which a number of 20-pound anti-personnel
bombs were sprinkled over the rebel positions. The dash down the valley
and into Nixwa the next day proved to be something of an anti-climax. 31
The rebellion's ringleaders casually repaired to their remote mountain
homes around Balat Salt, accompanied by most of their men. For their
part, the British decided somewhat prematurely that the rebellion had
been terminated. As engineers blew up the strongpolnts at Tanuf and
Kamah, British ground units prepared to withdraw. Sinclair explained
this move by stating that his British forces were neither trained nor
equipped for mountain operations, which was true enough. An underlying
reason for the premature withdrawal was probably the sensitiveness of
31Watt, p. 41.
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the home government to increasingly unfavorable publicity given the
expedition in the UN and world press. 32
Moat British soldiers—save some sappers and Hussars who helped re-
establish the oil interests—were leaving Oman by August 16, 1957. Air
Marshal Sir Hubert Patch, who had helped oversee the campaign, commented
that the Army and RAF had been "surprised at the largeness of the trans-
port problems involved."33 That the aircraft had been worked very hard
Indeed was admitted when the Highlanders were withdrawn along the oil
company road, through the Semail pass to the Muscat coast. Both vehicles
and aircraft were saved by the adoption of this course. 34
The use of aircraft in the campaign came in for discussion. Some
held that aircraft should be a last resort and should not be used for
preliminary "demonstrations." However, it would seem that the British
had made the bast use of aircraft in the unclear circumstances of Oman.
Their air strikes probably did little physical harm to the rebel force
in the early stages, but were successful in keeping most of the popula-
tion loyal or at least neutral at the time. An Indian doctor who had
been in the rebel zone stated that the people there knew that the British
would limit their air strikes. He went on to say that an indiscriminate
bombing policy would have caused the local tribesmen to turn more quickly
32Smilay, p. 33.
33LT, August 9, 1957, p. 6.
^T, August 17, 1957, p. 6.
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on the rebel* and turn them out.^ While the point la open to debate,
the Indian doctor's suggestion is far from persuasive. To adopt his
course would have meant playing clearly into the hands of the propaganda
mongers. Small tactical advantage could have been gained, and all-out
bombing might have served to alienate the populace as a whole from the
Sultan's government.
Perhaps Hanson W. Baldwin, the military analyst, directed the most
valid criticisms at the 1957 campaign in Oman. He stated that the power
of modern communications were largely ignored by the British, whose slow
progress gave their enemies time to make political capital out of a small
war. The campaign had a nineteenth-century aura about it. In that
century, as Baldwin pointed out, the colonial battles "were over by the
time the world's foreign offices knew of the conflicts.".*6
Baldwin held that Oman clearly showed the uselessness of the atomic
bomb, and the great limitations inherent in the combat plane. He pointed
out that the concept of air control had been shown to be unworkable In
Algeria, Malaya and Oman. Combat planes are a threat only to cities, to
population complexes. Only ground troops can dominate and police an
area, and in the present century, when speed is the key to war and
politics, the best solution is a fire brigade of all arms, streamlined
to possess both the speed and mobility. The British had attempted to
put together a crude fire brigade in Oman, and gained only incomplete
35LT, August 14, 1957, p. 6.
36NYT, August 9, 1957, p. 6.
38
succesa. They lacked helicopters, para-engineere to prepare emergency
airfields, and transports like the American-built C-130, which was de-
signed to operate from rough fields.''
These criticisms were significant, but Baldwin's suggestions were
hardly realistic for 1957. Still, they pointed up a lag in Western
tactical and strategic thinking, as well as the unique problems and
possibilities in small wars that are also modern to some extent.
2. Epilogue
Mr. Sandys, the British Minister of Defence, supported the techniques
of the 19S7 campaign, stressing that it had caused a "minimum loss of
lives. "38 This was true enough, though if the rebels had maintained
their strong positions in front of Firq, the story might have been dif-
ferent. It must be noted that the rebellion in Oman did not end with
the taking of Nixwa in 1957. This campaign had proved that British
troops could fight in the summer heat of Oman, if motor transport was
available to move the infantrymen, but had only succeeded In pushing the
rebels into even less accessible areas.
As It was, a long stalemate ensued, with the Sultan's forces main-
taining a partially effective siege of the rebel village in the Jebel
Akhdar (Green Mountains). Meanwhile, the British attempted to improve
the performance of the Sultan's soldiers by undertaking a program of re-
organization. Some of the troops, who were for the most part Baluchls from
37NYT, August 15, 1957, p. 4.
38LT, August 15, 1957, p. 8.
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the Sultan's South Asian enclave at Gwadur, were formed into the Muscat
Scouts. Thirty British officer* and ninety British NCO's, some of whom
were drawn from the Somaliland Scouts, led the original complement.™
Early in 1958 Britain's Under-Secretary of State for War arrived for
discussions with the Muscat i government. In July, an agreement was
announced providing for complete reorganization of all the armed forces
of the Sultan. Twenty-three British Army officers were immediately
seconded, along with five planes and pilots, and other equipment. Later,
the Royal Marines contributed one officer and 20 NCO's to the training
program. 40
Still, in June of 1958, the officers under contract to the Sultan,
as well as those seconded, agreed that British troops were needed to
assault the rebels stronghold and end the disturbance. Vehicles con-
tinued to encounter land mines, and lighter land rovers were temporarily
withdrawn from use. Finally, a request was made to Britain for at least
two battalions of Parachutists or Special Air Servicemen, who alone were
considered by the commanders on the spot as fit enough for the rugged
operation. 4 *
By this time the publicity from the Nizwa campaign of 1957 had
subsided considerably, and Britain readily gave the go-ahead for an
operation by the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) that was due
3Wt, p. 41.
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to return very shortly from Malaya. In October, therefore, the 80 men
of D Squadron SAS began patrola and acclimatization in Oman. It soon
became apparent that another aquadron was needed, and A Squadron was
flown in on January 12, 19S9, as final plans were being made for the
assault. The SAS was committed for only three months, and action would
have to come before April. *
The area for the assault was chosen—-a trackless, unguarded slope—
and air support marshalled. Two helicopters were stationed at Nlzwa to
carry casualties out to a field hospital there. Number 8 Venom Squadron
was on call, along with transports at Bahrein. Donkeys would be the
vehicle of reaupply if bad weather stopped supply aircraft from getting
through. Several diversionary probes were carried out by the Sultan's
forces. One Venom was lost accidentally when the pilot failed to pull
out of a dive on a strafing mission and crashed to his death on the
Jebel. The "voice ' Pembroke, used to broadcast propaganda to both rebels
and friends, lost one of its two engines to rifle fire but landed safely,
and was later used for reconnaisance by the SAS commanders.
Late on D-Day, January 25, 19S9, the two SAS squadrons pushed off
on the first leg of their assault. After nine and one-half hours of
hard climbing up the face of the Jebel, and a two-hour march across
a rocky col, the SAS halted to await heavy supplies on the morning of
D plus 1. The second part of the assault consisted of nine supply drops,
of 3,000 pounds each, by three RAF Valettaa flying from Bahrein. These
42Smiley, p. 38.
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drops proved doubly helpful In the final phase of the assault on the
outmaneuvered rebels, whose followers mistook the chutes for a paratroop
landing. When the rebel forces began to melt away from the stronghold,
only the leading elements of the SAS came under fire. A bullet hit and
exploded a grenade in one SAS man's pack and three men were severely
wounded. Two were dead within 24 hours even though helicopters had been
used to evacuate them. Almost immediately after the successful conclu-
sion of the operations on the Jebel, the SAS was flying home to Britain
in RAP Beverly transports.
Once again the three rebel leaders managed to slip away, only to
reappear in Saudi Arabia and Cairo where an Oraani Imamate was maintained.
Captured letters pointed to the Saudis as the original troublemakers.
The Imam's brother, Talib, had gained their support in 1956. He en-
listed 500 Omanis from among the oil field workers and was provided with
Saudi training facilities at Damman. After seven months' training most
of the rebels were directed to their homes in the Oman! Interior. Talib,
with 70-80 hard-core followers, was delayed some weeks when his boat
broke down, but finally managed to slip ashore in Oman and make his way
into the Green Mountains. There he linked up with dissidents of several
tribes and with the other trained men who were each provided with a rifle
and 200 rounds of ammunition. Some .50-caliber Browning automatic weapons
and scores of cheap but effective land mines had also been provided. '
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The liberal aid given one faction in an internal struggle, and the
ability of a determined group of conapiratore to elude detection by the
Royal Navy were a reminder that it was really only the coldness of the
local population that cauaed the failure of Talib'a scheme. British
troopa had once more proved that they could fight well in South Arabia.
The advantage! derived from having an elite, airlifted fire brigade that
could ahift from operations in Malaya to those in the harah winter of
the Green Mountains, were obvious.
V. THE RADFAN
As Sir Charles Johnston, Governor of Aden from 1960 to 1962, guided
the states toward a Federation of South Arabia in fact as well as in
form, the Yemen was shaken by republican revolution and civil war. Egypt
and Saudi Arabia confronted each other aa they backed rival factions In
the Yemen. Though the Yemen Republic renewed the Imam's claim to "South
Yemen," and was supported by several thousand Egyptian troops, the archi-
tects of the Federation proceeded calmly. On November 29, 1960, the
Aden Protectorate Levies had officially become the Army of the Federation.
As nationalist sentiments rose, especially in urban Aden Colony, the
British announced in 1964 that independence would be given not later
than 1968. In the meantime, the Federal Army and state guards were
paid and officered by Britain. Federation forces were still at the dis-
posal of the British officer commanding Land Forcea in the Middle East.
Britain continued to meet the coat of the defense establishment, from
partial subsidies to tribal guarda to the coat of the Mukalla Regulars
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and the Hadhrami Beduoin Legion in the Protectorate, as well as the
costs of the large RAF establishment in Aden.
To the north of Aden, the mountainous area known as the Sadfan
continued to be a prime trouble spot. In the late 1950's the British
had forced out the Sultan of Lahej who opposed them—he exiled himself
to Egypt—and put in their own man. Lahej and the Radfan continued to
be of importance to the British, and during the greater part of 1964
British and Federal troops campaigned in the Radfan in order to keep
vital road communication open with the north. During the same period,
the RAF faced adverse world opinion when it retaliated to 52 shooting
incidents along the Yemeni border. Hunter jets hit the fort at Harlb
after 15 minutes warning had been given. Federal troops patrolled the
border and attempted to stop the smuggling of land mines from the Yemen.
A fighter patrol was flown near the border to counter similar demonstra-
tions by the pilots of Egyptian MIG's.
When the traditionally dissident tribesmen of the Radfan were found
to have mortars, automatic weapons and portable radios, the British took
action to break the power of the "Red Wolves of the Radfan." The first
week of May, 1964, saw 600 men of the King's Own Scottish Borderers air-
lifted from England, an operation that took only two days. A battalion
of the First Lancashire Fusiliers was put on 24-hours notice in England.
But the bulk of the fighting to keep the Aden-Dhala road open was done
by elite Royal Marine and paratroop units, supported by Federal troops in
whose ranks native Arab offlcera were beginning to appear; further support
waa provided by an East Anglian battalion released for duty when the
Borderers arrived In Aden.
The tribesmen had built concrete emplacements overlooking the Dhala
road. Royal Marine Commandos pushed out from the airfield at Thumair
and the 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment lost 2 dead and 10 wounded in
early action. A captain and a private were missing; it was not until
two weeks later that a patrol found that the tribesmen had beheaded both
men. Though the UN Special Committee voted 18-3 to censure Britain for
her use of modern weapons against tribesmen. Prime Minister Douglas-Rome
stated that the ground troops would continue to get the "air cover they
need."44
Three peaks dominated the Dhala road. After several days of hard
fighting, two peaks—code names Coca Cola and Cap Badge—were taken by
the Parachutists and the East Angllans. Engineers set to work, blast-
ing a road through Wadi Buran into tribal country. The troops were
supplied by helicopters whenever highland winds permitted.4' All three
peaks were taken by May 8, and continuous pressure was kept on the tribes-
men. The next day a Shackleton dropped 14 1,000-pound bombs on positions
held by the Qutalbi and Ibdali tribes, the strongest in the Radfan. 46
The field force, commanded by Brigadier Hugh Blacker, swelled to 3,000
men. Two companies of Parachutists climbed a 4,000-foot ridge at night
and outflanked the tribesmen. Then, on the morning of May 21, they
44NYT, May 12, 1964, p. 3.
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cleared an enemy village, capturing aeven of Che enemy and the tribal
cattle herds. These paras were led by Korean War hero Lt. Colonel Tony
Farrar-Hockley who instructed his men: "If you're fired on, give 'em
all hell. But I don't want to see you bursting into buildings and
spraying the place with bullets like something in an American movie."4 '
Hunter fighter-bombers of the KAF continued to use rockets and
cannon against the tribesmen, and 103 mm howitzera were firing at ex-
treme range of about three miles. But the final defeat of the "Red
Wolves" came only after British Marines used ropes to climb the 2,000
foot Arnold Spur, thus showing the tribesmen, as Blacker was to put it,
that the troops could follow them anywhere.48
VI. SOOTH ARABIA AND THE WEST
After 1964, Britain held a fire brigade in South Arabia. Normally,
this meant a Royal Marine Commando and a squadron of the RAF Regiment.
Tactical air commands operated from Aden and Bahrein. Since 1963, the
Middle East was provided with its own unified command structure, usually
with a RAF air marshal as Commander-in-Chief. An air vice-marshal, a
major general and a rear admiral acted as assistants.
The elaborate air and naval bases at Aden provided a base for
strategic bombers as well as for security operations in South Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. To insure the progress of the Federation as a
47
NVT, May 22, 1964, p. 2.
48NYT, May 27, 1964, p. 11.
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•table political unit the United Kingdom, In the years 1956-1961, made
grants of some 5.5 million and loans of around another 1 million. A
further 5,694,000 went for direct services, including local military
forces.*" To judge whether these expenditures were successful one must
wait for the independence of the Federation of South Arabia. If It la
able to become a force for international law and order in the area, 50
the uses made of British manpower and wealth In the states will have
Justified. Much depends on the conduct of the Federal Army, whose
six veteran infantry battalions were raised to nine and augmented
by Artillery and aircraft during the last yeara of British rule.
An Emergency was declared in Aden Colony late in 1963, and the
situation steadily worsened as rival nationalist political groups sought
to destroy each other and to undermine what was left of British influence.
Incidents of terrorism lncreaaed from 36 in 1964, to 286 in 1965 and
510 in 1966. During these three years terrorists killed 86 and wounded
806 persons. To avert anarchy after Independence is declared, the
Federal Army will have to show not only that it is no longer an arm of
British imperialism, but that it is an effective military force, capable
of maintaining aecurity. Aa representatives of a native government, the
*9Gillian King, Imperial Outpost—Aden . London: Oxford University
Press, 1964, pp. 21 and 74.
^J. B. Kelly, Reviews of Johnson, Charles Hepburn, The View from
Steamer Point , and King, Gillian, Imperial Outpost—-Aden : In Middle
Eastern Studies 2:2 (January, 1966), p. 70.
5LThe Kansas City Times . March 16, 1967, p. 2D.
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Federal soldiers, In some instance* at least, will have broader opportun-
ities when dealing with the population. In the areas where any govern-
ment at all is viewed as anathema, it is likely that the Federal Army
will have to prove Itself again and again.
Western planners, as long as the West has an interest in the oil
and the stability of the South Arabian states, must be aware of the
precedents and conditions affecting war in the area. It is not at all
improbable that Weatern forces may be called to the aid of friendly
governments and be asked to undertake limited actions not unlike those
of the British. Some, but not all of the strategic purposes of the
West may be served by the presence of rocket-firing nuclear submarines
cruising in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Western commanders, as well
as those of the Federal Army, should be requirements for security oper-
ations in South Arabia, as they were revealed in the operations under
British rule.
First, there is the need for well-trained, locally-based forces
of the Levy pattern. Constant patrolling must be undertaken, to insure
contact with the people and promote law and order. Thla will also guard
against extensive inroads or buildups by guerrillas. Sufficient air
strength, for purposes of resupply and ground support, should be provided.
Secondly, attention must be given to the peculiarities of climate
and topography present in South Arabia. Extreme variations are often
found in a small area. The effect of logistics, morale, and maintenance
must be calculated whenever operations are planned for deserts or for
mountains ranging up to 10,000 feet. The necessity of acclimatising
troops to the various areas is another for locally based, though air-
supported, native troops.
Thirdly, there is the fact that the fire-brigade concept, with
some modifications, is useful to both the governments of the West and
that of the Federation. The number of elite troops need not be large,
but the factors of communication, mobility, supply and inter-service
cooperation must be stressed. Ideally, the elite squadrons would be
able to oparate and exist on their own if conditions put a stop to air
operations. For the Western powers, the commando carrier, acting as
a core for light naval escort and landing craft, and making use of
helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft, would be worthy of study.
Though sand storms and related phenomena put a limit on the helicopter's
use in some areas, it would seem to be an extremely valuable addition
to any fire brigade.
Fourthly, the use of modern ground support aircraft would be examined
thoroughly, in relation to unique southern Arabian conditions. Aircraft
have probably lost their novelty, if indeed they ever had any, for the
tribesmen. However, they seem to be useful, not as purely offensive
weapons, but as symbols of the determination of the central government
or of the protecting power, and as such may be profitably employed Co
keep the general population loyal or at least not openly rebellious.
The use of air strikes to support infantry drives depends on the nature
of the enemy and the terrain, to a large extent, for success. At best,
the caves and steep valley walls of many South Arabian areas make such
fighter-bombing difficult.
49
These, then, are some lessons drawn from a superficial study of the
operations in South Arabia, and it ia probably that the ideas, as well
aa the technique by which they were derived, will continue to be of use
in an area of the world where the basic determinants of action change
only very slowly.
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This report describes tlio military how of the la.it years of British
presence in South Arabia, rather than the political why ,
Britain became a land power in the Middle East to protect the routes
to India, and later secured influence over oil-producing states in a
strategic move to block other European powers. From 1517-1918 the Yemen,
the most populous and well-favored area of Arabia was nominally controlled
by the Turks. After 1911 Imams of the Zeidi sect gained control and in
the 1934 treaty with Britain formal independence. Britain and Yemen agreed
to maintain the status quo along the borders, but clashed over interpre-
tation of the phrase.
The protected states of the Aden Protectorate provided a buffer for
the important British base at Aden. In 1959 the British began to group
the tiny states into a Federation and allowed some representative govern-
ment in Aden Colony. In rugged Muscat and Oman to the east, the Sultan's
power was challenged by Imam Ghalib (1954- ) after years of peace
following the mysterious Treaty of Sib (1920) which gave the Iman power
in the Omani interior.
Britain became a Protecting Power in the Trucial States to suppress
piracy and secure trade. In an area of many tiny sheikdoms modernization
came slowly and British-led forces had to continually guard against bor-
der incursions. Local dissidents were always a problem in protected tri-
bal areas. After 1945 foreign assistance to internal revolts provided a
more serious problem. After the 1914-1918 War Britain adopted a system
combining RAF aircraft with Levy forces to police the protected tribal
areas. Aircraft combatted droughts as well as supplied garrisons in the
Protectorate. British ground troops were committed in the 1950 's as
disturbances multiplied, Chough RAF control was retained,, Continuous
patrolling was necer.sary in the tribal areas even though modern ground
support aircraft were used extensively.
In the late 1950's Yemen made major incursions into the Protectorate.
British and native troops, supported by jets, used their firepower spar-
ingly. In Oman (1957) the Sultan's troops were bested by rebels with
modern weapons and training supplied by the Saudis. Slowly, a British
composite force moved into the interior using traditional methods. British
forces were unsuited to finishing the rebellion in the mountains, and were
withdrawn. Aircraft were only effective in presenting a government
presence to the populace. Finally, in 1959, elite Special Air Service
Squadrons, supplied by air from Bahrein, took the rebel stronghold.
When it was found that the tribesmen of the Radfan mountains north
of Aden possessed modern weapons, British and Levy forces cleared the
major roads in a 1964 campaign that saw extensive use of artillery and
air support, but most notably of elite units in the necessary elimination
of traditional tribal strongholds.
Nuclear submarines cannot protect all of the interests of the West
in South Arabia, and lessons from the British campaigns may be important
to the West as well as to the security forces of the newly independent
Federation. First, well-trained, locally-based levy-type forces are
necessary. Patrolling promotes law and order and guards against
guerrillas. Secondly, the extremes of topography and climate in a
small area must be noted in planning operations in desert and mountains.
Thirdly, the composite fire-brigade rce, including elice infantry
supplieJ by air, and provided with inter-service cooperation and
adequate communication, would be useful for the harder jobs. Commando
carriers could be used by the West. Fourthly, direct air support must
be studied, as it has appeared to have limited, special, uses in South
Arabian conditions.
